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Government power is divided between the states and federal govern-
ment.  States have general government authority within their borders, while
the federal government has only limited powers but jurisdiction over the
entire country.  One reason for this division of power is to guard against the
abuse of government power.  As James Madison put it, “[t]he different gov-
ernments will control each other.”1  But the balance of power established by
the Constitution has shifted over time.  Changes in technology, commerce,
politics, and various other areas have led to the expansion of federal power.
Broad interpretations of Article I have expanded the realm of federal poli-
cymaking, and the rise of administrative agencies has expanded the power of
the federal executive branch.
These expansions suggest a greater need for oversight to ensure that the
federal government does not abuse its power.  That task has fallen to the
courts.  Courts no longer play only their traditional role of resolving disputes
between individuals.2  They now regularly review agency actions and assess
the constitutionality of federal statutes.3
But courts cannot always effectively ensure federal compliance with the
law.  One impediment is the law of standing.  Ordinarily, for an individual to
have standing, he must demonstrate that he has suffered a particularized,
concrete injury in fact.4  For this reason, individuals cannot sue the United
States simply for violating the Constitution or federal law.5  The injury from
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1 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2 See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J.
1363, 1369–70 (1973) (describing the shift in the role of the federal courts).
3 See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
275, 291 (2008) (discussing the rise of “nontraditional forms of action, such as declaratory
judgments and actions authorizing agency review”).
4 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–48 (2016).
5 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1992).
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disobedience is “undifferentiated and ‘common to all members of the pub-
lic,’”6 and redressing that injury thus is a task for “the political branches.”7
To have standing to proceed in federal court, the individual must establish
that he suffered a factual injury because of the failure to obey the law.
But for states, things are different.  Like private persons, states can estab-
lish standing by demonstrating that they have suffered or are about to suffer
an injury in fact.  But states are not individuals; they are sovereigns, and in
that capacity they have the power to protect the public interest.  For that
reason, the Supreme Court has developed two strands of doctrine supporting
broader state standing.  First, states can establish standing by demonstrating a
violation of a sovereign interest, such as a violation of a state law.8  Second,
states have standing to vindicate so-called quasi-sovereign interests—an ill-
defined category of interests that roughly captures the state’s interest in pro-
tecting its populace.9  Because quasi-sovereign interests protect state
residents, the Court has held that states have standing to press those interests
in their capacity as parens patriae—as the representative of the residents.10
This latter type of standing would seem to support state standing to sue
the federal government for not obeying federal law and the Constitution.
After all, those laws exist for a reason; they reflect a judgment that their
observance will improve society.  States accordingly have a quasi-sovereign
interest in seeing that they are observed.
Nevertheless, judges have concluded that states do not have standing
based on their quasi-sovereign interests to sue the United States for not obey-
ing the law.  Two different reasons have been given.  First, because a state can
assert quasi-sovereign interests only in its capacity of representing its
residents, a state has standing to press those interests only if it can demon-
strate that its residents have suffered an injury in fact.11  On this view, states
do not have general standing to sue the federal government for disobeying
the law; they have standing only if they can show that the disobedience
injured a resident.  Second, states are not the appropriate bodies to
represent as parens patriae the interests of their residents in seeing the United
States comply with the law.  Instead, the United States itself, which also repre-
sents the residents of a state, is the appropriate body to ensure that it com-
plies with federal and constitutional law.12
6 Id. at 575 (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974)); see
also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (stating that “generalized grievances” are “most appropriately
addressed in the representative branches” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499–500 (1975))).
7 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576.
8 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601
(1982).
9 See id.
10 See id. at 600, 602.
11 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 538 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
12 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923).
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This Essay challenges these conclusions.  It does so in two ways.  First, it
argues that parens patriae is the wrong frame to evaluate state standing to
assert quasi-sovereign interests.  The states themselves, not their residents,
hold quasi-sovereign interests.  A state that asserts those interests is not acting
in a representative capacity; it is asserting its own interest.  Therefore, it is
irrelevant to the state’s standing whether the resident has suffered a harm.
And it is irrelevant whether the state or the United States is the appropriate
body to assert the resident’s interests.
Next, the Essay argues that states should be able to assert this quasi-sover-
eign interest against the United States for three reasons.  First, states have the
primary responsibility for enforcing the law and ensuring the safety of soci-
ety.  Second, they act as a check on the federal system.  Third, permitting
states to pursue those claims aligns with the purposes of extending Article III
jurisdiction to suits in which states are a party.
The Essay proceeds in five Parts.  Part I describes the three strands of
state standing.  It focuses particularly on parens patriae standing to assert
quasi-sovereign interests.  Part II criticizes the parens patriae framework.  It
argues that states hold quasi-sovereign interests and accordingly should have
direct standing to assert them.  Part III argues that states should be able to
assert these interests against the United States because of the unique role
that states play in our federal system.  Part IV argues that recognizing state
standing to bring these suits is consistent with the separation of powers theo-
ries underlying standing doctrine.  Part V acknowledges that although the
Constitution does not prohibit state standing to sue the federal government
for disobeying the law, there may be nonconstitutional reasons to limit the
states’ ability to sue the federal government.  But it argues that for structural
reasons, Congress, and not the courts, is the appropriate body to impose
those subconstitutional limitations.
I. THE CURRENT LAW OF STATE STANDING
Standing defines who may bring suit in federal court.  It has both consti-
tutional and prudential components.  The constitutional standing doctrines
implement the “case” and “controversy” limitation in Article III.  To have
Article III standing, the plaintiff must assert the violation of a legally pro-
tected interest.  Prudential standing doctrines do not derive from the Consti-
tution, but instead are judicially created limitations on federal jurisdiction.
Prominent among those doctrines is the restriction on third-party standing.
Even when a party has Article III standing to bring suit, that party ordinarily
cannot assert the rights of another individual.  If a plaintiff fails to establish
Article III or prudential standing, the court must dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction.13
For the most part, cases discussing standing have focused on Article III
standing.  According to the Court, the driving force behind Article III stand-
13 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
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ing is the separation of powers.14  Standing’s requirements aim to prevent
the federal courts from usurping the role of the political branches of govern-
ment.  As the Court has put it, standing “is founded in concern about the
proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.”15
Standing achieves this goal by confining the judicial power to resolving dis-
putes that were “traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial
process.”16
The Court has identified three different types of interests that can sup-
port state standing.  First, a state can establish standing by demonstrating that
it has suffered an injury in fact to its proprietary interests.17  Second, a state
can establish standing by demonstrating a violation of the state’s sovereign
interests.18  Third, a state can establish standing to its quasi-sovereign inter-
ests.19  When a state asserts these sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests, it
need not meet the same factual injury threshold.
A. Proprietary Standing
Ordinarily, for an individual to have standing, he must establish that he
has suffered an “injury in fact.”20  That injury must be “concrete” and “partic-
ularized,” and it must involve the “invasion of a legally protected interest.”21
Moreover, the injury must be traceable to the defendant and it must be of
the sort that the courts can redress through a favorable decision.22  Accord-
ing to the Court, requiring individuals to demonstrate injuries in fact ensures
that courts stay within their traditional role of remedying individual rights.
To protect the separation of powers, however, the Court has limited the
types of injuries that can support standing.  It has concluded that individuals
lack standing to bring suit alleging only that the government failed to comply
with the law.23  According to the Court, the injury from disobedience is a
“generalized grievance” that is “undifferentiated and ‘common to all mem-
bers of the public.’”24  Redressing that injury thus is not “the business of the
courts” but is instead a task for “the political branches.”25  To have standing
14 See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157 (2014) (“The law of Article
III standing . . . is built on separation-of-powers principles . . . .” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013))).
15 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
16 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998).
17 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601
(1982).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 602–03.
20 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).
21 Id. at 1548 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
22 See id. at 1547.
23 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 575–76.
24 Id. at 575 (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974)).
25 Id. at 576.
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to proceed to court, the individual must establish that he suffered a factual
injury because of the failure to obey the law.
This same standing scheme applies to the states.  Like individuals, states
can enter into contracts and own property.26  And states can bring suit to
vindicate these proprietary interests.27  Moreover, just like an individual, to
establish standing to assert these interests, the state must demonstrate that it
has suffered a distinct, concrete injury in fact by this wrongdoing.28  The
same restrictions on what injuries will support standing also apply.  States
cannot invoke their proprietary interests to sue the United States solely on
the ground that the United States has failed to comply with the law.  Only if
the violation results in a particularized injury to a state does the state have
proprietary standing.29
B. Sovereign Standing
Although demonstrating an injury in fact is the only way that an individ-
ual can establish standing, states can establish standing in other ways.  States
are sovereigns, and they have the responsibility to protect their populace and
territory.  States may bring suit to vindicate these sovereign interests, includ-
ing the ability to enforce their laws,30 to protect their borders from encroach-
ment, and to prevent the federal government from legislating in areas
reserved to state control.31
Unlike with nonsovereign interests, states can sue to enforce these sover-
eign interests without demonstrating an injury in fact.32  A state need not
demonstrate that it has suffered a factual injury to have standing to bring a
prosecution for violation of state criminal laws.33  Thus, states have sovereign
26 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 455 (1793) (Wilson, J.).
27 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601–02
(1982).
28 See id.
29 Although courts have applied the injury-in-fact requirement to the states asserting
proprietary standing, the requirement arguably should be relaxed for the states. See F.
Andrew Hessick & William P. Marshall, State Standing to Constrain the President, 21 CHAP. L.
REV. 83, 105 (2018) (“[T]he injury in fact test should be relaxed when a state sues to force
executive officers to comply with the law.”).
30 See Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601.
31 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986) (finding state standing based on the
“interest in the continued enforceability of its own statutes”); Tara Leigh Grove, When Can
A State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 886 (2016) (“States may challenge
federal statutes or regulations that preempt or otherwise undermine the enforceability of
state law, even when the States are not themselves the objects of the regulations.”).
32 See Grove, supra note 31, at 886.
33 Although standing is not a barrier, states cannot prosecute state crimes in federal
court because of the ancient doctrine that one sovereign cannot execute the criminal laws
of another sovereign. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 481 (1923); Wisconsin v.
Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 288 (1888).  Moreover, it may be that Article III forbids state
prosecutions in federal court because it extends diversity jurisdiction only to “controver-
sies,” which some have argued refers to civil cases. See, e.g., James E. Pfander, Rethinking the
Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in State-Party Cases, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 607 n.207
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standing to challenge federal laws that preempt state laws even when the pre-
empting federal law does not factually harm the state,34 and states have sover-
eign standing to defend their laws against claims that their laws are
unconstitutional or preempted, even when no other factual harm would
result if the state law were struck down.35
Under current thinking, however, sovereign standing does not provide a
basis for states to sue the United States for failing to comply with federal law
or the U.S. Constitution.  The states’ sovereign interests are in the creation
and enforcement of state law.  A state does not a have sovereign interest in
the enforcement of federal law or the U.S. Constitution.36  It is only if the
violation of the federal law or the Constitution interferes with state law that a
state suffers a sovereign injury supporting sovereign standing.37
C. Quasi-Sovereign Standing
States also have standing to assert so-called quasi-sovereign interests.
The Court has not precisely defined these interests.38  It has said that they
are not nonsovereign interests comparable to those held by individuals, nor
are they sovereign interests relating to the state’s ability to govern.39  They
consist roughly of the state’s interest in protecting “the well-being of its popu-
lace.”40  In place of a more specific definition, the Court has given two exam-
ples of interests falling into this category.  The first is the state’s interest in
“not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal sys-
tem.”41  The second is the state’s interest in protecting the physical and eco-
nomic health of its residents by, for example, reducing pollution and
(1994) (collecting scholarly articles agreeing that “controversies,” unlike “cases,” exclude
criminal cases).
34 See West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 868 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding state standing
to challenge federal regulation requiring states to adopt new standards or to accept federal
standards).
35 Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137 (“[A] State clearly has a legitimate interest in the continued
enforceability of its own statutes.”).
36 There are reasons to doubt these conclusions.  Among other things, the Supremacy
Clause obliges states to enforce federal and constitutional law when they conflict with state
law. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.  Additionally, the Supreme Court has strictly limited the ability
of states to curtail their own jurisdiction to hear claims involving federal or constitutional
law. See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 737–38 (2009).  Thus, not only is “federal law . . .
as much the law of the several States as are the laws passed by their legislatures”; states also
have an affirmative obligation to provide a forum to enforce those laws. Id. at 734.
37 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323–25 (1966) (upholding South
Carolina’s standing to seek enforcement of state law against U.S. Attorney General).
38 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982)
(“[A] ‘quasi-sovereign’ interest . . . is a judicial construct that does not lend itself to a
simple or exact definition.”).
39 See id. at 602 (“They are not sovereign interests, proprietary interests, or private
interests pursued by the State as a nominal party.”).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 607.
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unemployment in the state or preserving wildlife in the state.42  Although
quasi-sovereign interests are held by the states, the populace of the state is
the beneficiary of asserting the interest.  For this reason, the Court has said
that states asserting these interests operate in a representative capacity—they
have standing parens patriae.43
As with sovereign interest standing, states have generally not been suc-
cessful in relying on parens patriae standing to sue the federal government for
disobeying federal law or the Constitution.  That is so for two, interrelated
reasons.  First, according to some cases, states must demonstrate that its pop-
ulace has suffered an injury in fact to assert parens patriae standing.  Under
these decisions, a legal violation that does not cause injury in fact to the pop-
ulace is not a basis for parens patriae standing.  Second, the Court has held
that, even if the populace does suffer a factual injury from the federal govern-
ment’s failure to obey the law, the states cannot sue the federal government
parens patriae because the federal government is the appropriate party to pro-
tect the populace from violations of federal law.
1. Parens Patriae as Third-Party Standing
One obstacle to parens patriae standing to challenge the federal govern-
ment’s failure to comply with the law is a strand of opinions suggesting that
parens patriae standing is a species of third-party standing under which the
state asserts the rights of its populace.  Under this view, to establish parens
patriae standing, the state must show that the populace whose rights are being
asserted has suffered an injury in fact.  States accordingly do not have parens
patriae standing to challenge failure to comply with the law unless they can
demonstrate that the legal violation harmed individuals.
This view of parens patriae standing derives from the historical definition
of parens patriae.  Historically, parens patriae referred to the notion of the king
as parent of the country.  In that role, the king could stand as guardian for
persons incapable of acting for themselves, such as infants, lunatics, and
charities.  In that capacity, the king could exercise all the usual powers of a
guardian,44 including bringing suits on behalf of those persons.45
Early American law adopted this definition of parens patriae.  In decisions
through the late nineteenth century, the Court stated that states had the
power to act parens patriae “for the prevention of injury to those who cannot
protect themselves.”46  In the 1900 decision of Louisiana v. Texas, the Court
expanded parens patriae to refer to the state acting as the protector of all her
42 See Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 393–94 (1938).
43 See Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 604.
44 See Michael Malina & Michael D. Blechman, Parens Patriae Suits for Treble Damages
Under the Antitrust Laws, 65 NW. U. L. REV. 193, 198 (1970); see also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *427–28.
45 See State Protection of Its Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 411, 412 (1970); see also Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1, 57–58 (1890).
46 Latter-Day Saints, 136 U.S. at 57.
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citizens, not just those who were incapable of acting for themselves.47  But in
expanding the scope of parens patriae, the Court did not abandon the basic
principle that a state acts as a representative of others when it sues as parens
patriae.  Thus, parens patriae suits were originally akin to a type of third-party
standing.  The state did not bring a suit to assert its own rights.  Instead, the
state brought suit as a representative of individuals to assert their rights.
Based on this view, Chief Justice Roberts in his dissent in Massachusetts v.
EPA concluded that parens patriae actions do not provide an independent
basis for state standing; instead, he described parens patriae as a form of third-
party standing.48  In his view, for a state to have parens patriae standing, it
must establish that the residents being protected have suffered factual inju-
ries supporting Article III standing.49  As Roberts put it, “a State asserting
quasi-sovereign interests as parens patriae must still show that its citizens satisfy
Article III.”50
On this view, parens patriae standing does not permit the state to sue the
federal government for failing to comply with the law in situations when indi-
viduals cannot. Parens patriae standing provides a basis for such a challenge
only if the government’s illegal conduct results in an identifiable injury to the
state’s populace.  The state accordingly has no special role in preventing fed-
eral misconduct.
2. The Restrictions on the United States
The second obstacle to parens patriae standing to sue the United States is
that the Court has held that a state simply does not have parens patriae stand-
ing to force the federal government to comply with federal law or the Consti-
tution.51  The reason is that the states do not have the only interest in
protecting the populace.  Rather, because residents of a state are also
residents of the United States, the United States also has an interest in pro-
tecting the population.52  According to the Court, the United States has the
primary responsibility of managing the federal government and ensuring its
compliance with federal law.53  Therefore, states cannot sue the federal gov-
ernment as parens patriae to protect state citizens from the operation of fed-
eral law.  For example, in Massachusetts v. Mellon, the Court held that
Massachusetts lacked parens patriae standing to challenge the constitutionality
of a federal law giving money to states that took certain measures to protect
mothers and infants.54  According to the Court, “it is the United States, and
47 Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 19 (1900).
48 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 538 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923).
52 See id.
53 See id.
54 Id. at 479, 486.
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not the state, which represents [the people] as parens patriae” in ensuring the
proper administration of federal law.55
Although a separate restriction on suits against the United States, this
limitation is tied to the view of parens patriae as a restriction on third-party
standing.  The theory is that a state can sue parens patriae only if (1) its popu-
lace has suffered an Article III harm and (2) the law authorizes the state to
bring that suit.  Thus, in Mellon, the Court concluded that the law does not
authorize the states to bring suit on behalf of its citizens against the United
States to challenge a federal law.56  According to the Court, the law assigns to
the United States the role of protecting the interest of U.S. citizens in not
being subject to an unconstitutional federal law.57  Moreover, because it is a
restriction on third-party standing, which is a prudential doctrine, Congress
can waive it through appropriate legislation.58
II. FIXING THE INCOHERENCE SURROUNDING QUASI-SOVEREIGN INTERESTS
Both of the restrictions on states asserting their quasi-sovereign interests
as a basis for standing to sue the federal government are unwarranted.  First,
parens patriae standing is the wrong framework to evaluate suits in which
states assert quasi-interests.  Those interests belong to the states, not their
populace.  Accordingly, states asserting quasi-sovereign interests assert their
own interests; they do not act as a parens patriae asserting the rights of others.
Second, because states assert their own interests and do not act as parens
patriae when they assert quasi-sovereign interests, the relationship of the fed-
eral government to the populace is irrelevant to the states’ ability to assert
those interests.
The two quasi-sovereign interests that the Court has identified are the
interest in protecting “the well-being of its populace” and ensuring the state
is “not . . . discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal sys-
tem.”59  Individuals do not hold these interests.  Individuals do not have the
duty to protect the well-being of the state’s populace or the rightful status of
a state.  Instead, the state has these responsibilities.  To be sure, the benefi-
ciaries of these quasi-sovereign interests are the populace of the state.  But it is
the state that holds and acts on these interests to protect the populace.60
55 Id. at 486.
56 Id. at 485–86.
57 See id. at 485–86 (“While the state, under some circumstances, may sue in that
capacity for the protection of its citizens, it is no part of its duty or power to enforce their
rights in respect of their relations with the Federal Government.  In that field it is the
United States, and not the state, which represents them . . . .” (citation omitted)).
58 See Md. People’s Counsel v. FERC, 760 F.2d 318, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (arguing that
Congress can waive parens patriae limitations).
59 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602, 607
(1982).
60 See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) (“[I]t must surely be conceded that,
if the health and comfort of the inhabitants of a state are threatened, the state is the
proper party to represent and defend them.”).
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Early standing decisions support this understanding.  For example, in
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, two States brought suit to block the enforce-
ment of a West Virginia law limiting the export of natural gas.61  In holding
that the States could bring suit, the Court did not focus on the harm to the
States’ residents.  Instead, the Court said that cutting off the gas would jeop-
ardize the “health, comfort and welfare” of each State’s residents and accord-
ingly that the State, “as the representative of the public, has an interest apart
from that of the individuals affected” to address this “matter of grave public
concern.”62
More recently, the majority opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA reiterated
that view.63  There, Massachusetts sued the EPA for refusing to regulate car-
bon dioxide emissions that could lead to global warming.64  In considering
whether Massachusetts had standing to assert quasi-sovereign interests, the
Court stated that, when a state asserts quasi-sovereign interests, it does not
simply represent her citizens “to protect [them].”65  Instead, the state seeks
to “assert its rights under federal law.”66
To be sure, a state that asserts a quasi-sovereign interest acts in a capacity
similar to a traditional parens patriae.  In both situations, the state is asserting
interests that benefit residents of the state.  But there is a significant differ-
ence between a parens patriae suit and a quasi-sovereignty suit.  In a parens
patriae suit, the state asserts the interests of another person for that person’s
benefit—much like a guardian may assert an interest of its ward.  By contrast,
in a quasi-sovereignty suit, the state asserts its own interest in protecting the
populace—much like the Sierra Club has its own interest in protecting the
environment, though doing so benefits the public.67
61 Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
62 Id. at 592 (“Their health, comfort and welfare are seriously jeopardized by the
threatened withdrawal of the gas from the interstate stream.  This is a matter of grave
public concern in which the state, as the representative of the public, has an interest apart
from that of the individuals affected.”).  Other decisions from that era that today would be
considered to involve quasi-sovereign interests likewise did not label the interests at stake
as quasi-sovereign. See New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 301–02 (1921) (“The health,
comfort and prosperity of the people of the state and the value of their property being
gravely menaced, as it is averred that they are by the proposed action of the defendants,
the state is the proper party to represent and defend such rights by resort to the remedy of
an original suit in this court under the provisions of the Constitution of the United
States.”); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 99 (1907) (holding that Kansas had standing to
bring suit to challenge Colorado water appropriations, because a state “has an interest as a
state in this large tract of land bordering on the Arkansas river.  Its prosperity affects the
general welfare of the state.”); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 19 (1900) (not distinguishing
between sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests).
63 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
64 Id. at 520–21 n.17.
65 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S.
439, 447 (1945)).
66 Id.
67 Unlike the Sierra Club, states have standing to assert these intangible interests
because they are sovereigns. See supra notes 32, 38–40 and accompanying text.
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The first case to recognize parens patriae standing, Louisiana v. Texas,68
supports this understanding.  There, Louisiana sued Texas, seeking to enjoin
a Texas embargo prohibiting the importation of goods from Louisiana.69  In
determining whether Louisiana had standing, the Court explained that Loui-
siana did not allege “any infringement of the powers of the State of Louisi-
ana, or any special injury to her property.”70  Instead, her basis for bringing
suit was that the “matters complained of affect her citizens at large.”71  That
interest, the Court concluded, sufficed to support Louisiana’s suit.72  In so
concluding, the Court did not say that Louisiana was acting as parens patriae
by asserting the rights of its citizens—nor could it since parens patriae
described when a state sought to assert the rights of those incapable of acting
for themselves, as opposed to all citizens.  Instead, it said that Louisiana was
“present[ing] herself in the attitude of parens patriae”73—phrasing that sug-
gests that the Court considered Louisiana’s suit to be similar to a parens
patriae suit, but not actually a parens patriae suit.
One might argue that, even if quasi-sovereign interests belong to the
states, the violation of those interests alone does not support standing.
Instead, to have standing, the state must point to some additional harm suf-
fered by the citizenry.  But the cases do not support that conclusion.74  Many
cases upholding state standing based on quasi-sovereign interests do not
focus on the injury to the residents.75  For example, in Missouri v. Illinois, the
Court held that Missouri was the “proper party” to sue to enjoin Illinois from
diverting sewage into a channel flowing into the Mississippi River.76  The
Court did not base Missouri’s ability to sue on particular harms suffered by
the residents.  Instead, the Court stated that the “threat[ ]” to the “health
and comfort of the inhabitants of a State” provided an adequate basis for the
State’s suit.77
68 176 U.S. 1 (1900).
69 Id. at 11.
70 Id. at 19.
71 Id.
72 See id.
73 Id. (emphasis added).
74 Md. People’s Counsel v. FERC, 760 F.2d 318, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“It is unques-
tionable that a state, in its parens patriae capacity, does qualify as ‘personally . . . suffer[ing]
some actual or threatened injury’ . . . .” (alterations in original) (quoting Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472
(1982))).
75 See e.g., id. (stating that if violations of quasi-sovereign interests alone did not sup-
port standing, “the numerous cases allowing parens patriae standing in suits not involving
the federal government would be inexplicable”).
76 Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901).
77 Id.; see also Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592
(1982).  In Alfred L. Snapp, Puerto Rico brought suit challenging federal laws that Puerto
Rico claimed disproportionately injured the Puerto Rican economy. Id. at 594.  In assess-
ing Puerto Rico’s standing, the Court explained that states have a quasi-sovereign interest
in removing barriers that burdened commerce with those states. Id. at 607–08.  Moreover,
the Court said, a state need not demonstrate any harm to any individual from the discrimi-
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In short, states, and not their citizens, hold quasi-sovereign interests in
the well-being of the populace.  When a state asserts those interests, it does
not assert the interests of another.  Accordingly, the current doctrinal frame-
work of parens patriae standing to assert quasi-sovereign interests is superflu-
ous and should be discarded.
Recognizing that states should be able to assert quasi-sovereign interests
directly, as opposed to through parens patriae standing, also undermines the
separate restriction on states basing their standing on quasi-sovereign inter-
ests to sue the United States.  As noted in Part I, this separate limitation rests
on the theory that, when states invoke quasi-sovereign interests, they
represent their residents, and the federal government is in a superior posi-
tion to represent their residents on matters involving federal law.  That logic
does not apply if states hold quasi-sovereign interests.
In that case, when a state seeks to vindicate quasi-sovereign interests, the
state asserts its own interests, not the interests of its residents.  The standing
to assert that state-held interest is independent of its relationship with its citi-
zens.  It is accordingly irrelevant whether the state or the United States is in a
better position to represent the interests of residents.  The states can opt to
assert those interests even if the residents would prefer that they not.
III. THE COGNIZABILITY OF CLAIMS ALLEGING FEDERAL DISOBEDIENCE
That a state has a quasi-sovereign interest in protecting the well-being of
her populace does not necessarily establish that the state has standing to
force the federal government to comply with the Constitution and federal
law.  After all, individuals have an interest in ensuring that the federal gov-
ernment complies with the law, but the Court has held that they lack stand-
ing to pursue those claims.78
But that restriction should not apply to states.  Instead, states should be
able to force the federal government to comply with the law, for at least three
reasons.  First, states have the primary responsibility for enforcing the law
and ensuring the safety of society.  Second, they act as a check on the federal
system.  Third, permitting states to pursue those claims aligns with the pur-
poses of extending Article III jurisdiction to suits in which states are a party.
A. The State Power to Enforce the Law
Under our constitutional system, states shoulder the primary responsibil-
ity of protecting their citizens.79  Unlike the federal government,80 the states
nation. Id. Instead, the Court explained, “a State . . . ha[s] an interest, independent of the
benefits that might accrue to any particular individual, in assuring that the benefits of the
federal system are not denied to its general population.” Id. at 608.
78 See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996) (“[I]t is not the role of courts, but that
of the political branches, to shape the institutions of government in such fashion as to
comply with the laws and the Constitution.”).
79 See, e.g., Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1625 (2016).
80 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
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have general police power to promote the “health, peace, morals, education,
and good order of the people.”81  One aspect of this power is the ability to
sue to address unlawful conduct.  States generally have the power to bring
prosecutions and other lawsuits to remedy violations of the law.
Although usually discussed in the context of enforcing state law, this role
of the state extends more broadly.  States have all those powers that are not
withheld by the Constitution,82 unless federal law provides otherwise.  They
accordingly have the ability to enforce both the Constitution and federal
law.83  States can arrest individuals who violate those laws,84 and, with those
laws and their courts, can enter judgments enforcing those laws.85  Those
laws exist for the benefit of society, and states can choose to recognize those
benefits through seeking the law’s enforcement.
The Constitution explicitly contemplates that the states will enforce fed-
eral and constitutional laws.  Under the Supremacy Clause, the Constitution
and federal law are the supreme law in every state.86  Because they are law in
the states, states have the power to enforce them to the same extent as state
laws.  True, the Supremacy Clause is usually invoked to bind the state courts.
But the Clause is not limited to the state courts; it states that federal law and
the Constitution “shall be the supreme law of the land,”87 which suggests that
all officials must follow it.  To be sure, Congress can limit the power of states
to enforce federal law.88  For example, a federal statute may authorize only
the federal government to bring suit.
The state’s interest in preventing legal violations does not apply only to
violations by individuals and other states; it also extends to the federal gov-
ernment.  Federal violations are no less violations than violations committed
by others.  Accordingly, in the absence of a provision barring state enforce-
ment, states should be able to rely on their police power to address those
violations.
81 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1884).
82 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (stating that states retain all power except those powers exclusively delegated to the
federal government or prohibited to the states).
83 See Akhil Reed Amar, Comment, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 155 (1992) (“[S]tate lawmakers typically may support the
Constitution’s mandates using their general police power under their state
constitution . . . .”).
84 See, e.g., United States v. Argueta-Mejia, 615 F. App’x 485, 488 (10th Cir. 2015)
(“The federal constitution allows a state law enforcement officer to make an arrest for any
crime, including federal immigration offenses.”); Orin S. Kerr, Cross-Enforcement of the
Fourth Amendment, 132 HARV. L. REV. 471, 477–80 (2018).
85 See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 737–38 (2009).
86 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
87 Id.
88 See Kerr, supra note 84, at 478.
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B. The Role of the States in the Federal System
The role of the states in the Constitution’s design supports state stand-
ing to ensure the federal government’s compliance with the Constitution and
federal law.  A central theme of the Constitution is to prevent each govern-
ment body from accumulating too much power.  One way that the Constitu-
tion achieves this goal is by dividing power between the state and federal
governments.  States are governments of general power.  They have broad
regulatory and enforcement authority.  By contrast, the federal government
has only limited powers.  For example, Congress can legislate in only a few
specific areas, and federal courts can decide only certain types of cases.  At
the same time, however, when the federal government acts in the areas per-
mitted by the Constitution, that federal action trumps contrary state policies.
Another way that the Constitution limits federal power is by imposing
multiple structural constraints on the federal government.  Take, for exam-
ple, the bicameralism and presentment requirements.89  Even when Con-
gress seeks to legislate in an area within its authority, the proposed legislation
must pass both houses of Congress and be presented to the President.
States play a critical role in enforcing these limitations on the federal
government.  As Alexander Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 28, in an
effort to preserve their own power, state officials will “stand ready to check
the usurpations” of the federal government.90  Madison echoed this senti-
ment in Federalist No. 51, stating that the competition for power between the
state and federal government ensures that “[t]he different governments will
control each other.”91
One way for states to check federal power is to sue to enforce the con-
straints imposed by the Constitution on the federal government.92  There are
at least two reasons states would do so.  First, to the extent the federal law
embodies a policy with which the citizens of the state disagree, the states have
an interest in challenging those policies.  A successful challenge would not
only result in the voiding of the federal law; it would also encourage the
federal government to obey those constraints, many of which aim to improve
government policy choices.
89 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the
United States . . . .”).
90 THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
91 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458–59 (1991) (noting the states’ role in cabining fed-
eral power).
92 Others have disagreed with this point.  Professor Grove, for example, has argued
that states do not have a cognizable interest in seeing the federal government comply with
separation of powers requirements. See Grove, supra note 31, at 893.  In her view, “[s]tates
have broad standing to protect federalism principles, not the constitutional separation of
powers.” Id.  That view is entirely reasonable.  My view is that we should recognize the
states because states have an interest in federal observance of the separation of powers, and
because they have been assigned various roles in policing the separation of powers.
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Second, states have an interest in enforcing these provisions because fed-
eral policies trump state laws.  So long as a federal law remains on the books,
it preempts inconsistent state laws.  Moreover, that threat of preemption also
discourages states from enacting legislation in those areas in the future.  A
successful challenge arguing that the federal government’s actions violate the
Constitution would result in the law being struck down and would leave the
states with the authority to regulate in that area.
This state interest is not limited to constitutional provisions constraining
the legislative process.  It extends to all provisions limiting the federal gov-
ernment, because each limitation imposed by the Constitution leaves greater
responsibility to the states.93
The Incompatibility Clause provides an example.94  That Clause prohib-
its executive officers from being members of Congress.95  The reason for the
Clause is to prevent undue executive influence over Congress.  States have an
interest in enforcing that prohibition because executive control over Con-
gress could lead to fewer conflicts between Congress and the executive.  The
increased federal efficiency could lead to more federal policies and actions
that either displace state policies or, if those federal policies are deregulatory,
potentially foist more costs onto the states.
Nor is the state’s interest limited to enforcing constraints against Con-
gress.  It extends to constraints on all the branches of the federal govern-
ment.  Consider the process for appointing federal judges.  Under the
Constitution, the President nominates judges and sends them to the Senate
for confirmation.96  States have an interest in enforcing that process, because
fewer federal judges results in a smaller federal judiciary and, consequently,
more cases being filed in state court.  The increased state dockets mean that
state judges have greater control over the implementation and development
of state and federal law.  Of course, states may choose not to enforce the con-
firmation process because they would prefer to share the workload with the
federal courts.  But this suggests only that states have discretion whether to
bring suit, not whether they can at all.
93 This argument—that states should have standing to force the federal government to
comply with the Constitution and federal law—does not extend to federal violations of
individual rights.  It supports standing only for federal violations of structural provisions
that cabin the scope of federal power.  Moreover, historically only those individuals whose
rights had been violated could bring suit to vindicate those rights. See F. Andrew Hessick,
The Separation-of-Powers Theory of Standing, 95 N.C. L. REV. 673, 704 (2017) (developing his-
torical point that the government could not vindicate individual rights).
94 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
95 See id.
96 Id. art. II, § 2 (“[H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States . . . .”).  This provision requires only that Supreme Court Justices be confirmed by
the Senate, which suggests that lower Article III judges need not be confirmed by the
Senate, but no Article III judges have been appointed outside this process. See Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Checking the Court, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 18, 57 (2016).
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The discussion to this point has focused on the Constitution, but states
also have an interest in forcing the federal government to comply with fed-
eral law.  Federal law constrains the federal government just as much as the
Constitution.  For example, an agency cannot promulgate a regulation
outside its area of delegated authority, nor can it promulgate a regulation
without consulting with the Department of the Interior to ensure that its rule
does not jeopardize an endangered species as required by the Endangered
Species Act.97  States have an interest in enforcing these limitations because
they limit federal power and accordingly leave more power to the states.
Moreover, these limitations also aim to produce better policies.  Restric-
tions on agency actions promote democratic accountability by limiting the
power of unelected federal officials; the consultation requirement aims to
ensure that federal policies do not harm endangered species.  State enforce-
ment of these limitations helps promote better policies.
One might argue that although states play a role in constraining the
federal government, the Constitution prescribes ways other than litigation
they may do so.  Under the Constitution, states draw districts for the House,98
appoint presidential electors,99 and elect senators.100  These provisions give
the states considerable roles in the political branches where they can affect
federal policy.101  Because these political mechanisms are explicitly listed in
the Constitution, one might argue, they are the exclusive means by which the
states can force the federal government to comply with the Constitution and
federal law.102
But one should not lightly read implicit limitations on the states into the
Constitution.  The states do not owe their existence or powers to the Consti-
tution.103  States exist independently of the Constitution, and they have gen-
eral power except to the extent that the Constitution limits it.  Those powers
include the power to litigate.  Without an explicit provision prohibiting state
litigation, it should be permitted.
There is a much more mundane explanation for the provisions specify-
ing the states’ role in Congress and the presidency.  Congress and the presi-
97 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012).
98 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
99 Id. art. II, § 1.
100 Id. amend. XVII.
101 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“[E]ach of the principal branches of the federal government will owe its existence more
or less to the favor of the State governments, and must consequently feel a dependence,
which is much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious than too overbearing
towards them.”); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 546–47
(1954).
102 Cf. Wechsler, supra note 101, at 546–47.
103 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 448 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting) (“A
State does not owe its origin to the Government of the United States, in the highest or in any
of its branches.  It was in existence before it.  It derives its authority from the same pure
and sacred source as itself . . . .”).
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dency are offices of the United States, not of the states.  Because one
sovereign does not ordinarily pick the officers of another sovereign, states
would not have a role in selecting those officers if the Constitution did not
include those provisions.  Those provisions empower states; they do not dis-
empower them.
C. The Extension of the Federal Judicial Power to State Suits
State standing to force compliance with the Constitution is also consis-
tent with the provisions extending federal jurisdiction to suits brought by
states.  Before the enactment of the Constitution, each state was a separate
sovereign.  Historically, sovereigns ordinarily did not sue in the courts of
another sovereign, although they could if they chose to do so.104  Instead of
filing suits, sovereigns that had disputes often relied on diplomacy or war.105
So too with the states.106  Before 1789, state courts did hear claims
against other states and other out-of-state litigants, but those decisions were
not always honored.107  When one state disapproved of the decision of a
court from another state, the former state would simply refuse to respect the
decision.108  The inadequacy of this process meant that states turned to other
means to resolve their disputes.  States often resolved disputes through non-
judicial negotiations.109  But they sometimes resorted to bloodshed.110  A dis-
pute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania over territory led to war in the
1770s;111 conflict also erupted in 1779 over a dispute involving Massachu-
104 See Hullett v. King of Spain (1828) 4 Eng. Rep. 1041, 1048; 2 Bligh N.S. 31, 47–48
(recognizing British judicial jurisdiction over the king of Spain).
105 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 6, at 54 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(noting “the uniform course of human events” to resort to war to resolve sovereign dis-
putes); Note, The Original Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court, 11 STAN. L. REV. 665,
673 (1959).
106 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 61–66 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (describing hostilities between the states).
107 See Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice’’: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention
of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1427–28.
108 See id. at 1428 (“The state courts also showed little respect for the decrees of other
states.”).
109 See 1 HAMPTON L. CARSON, THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES WITH BIOGRAPHIES OF ALL THE CHIEF AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES 74–76 (Philadelphia,
P.W. Ziegler Co. 1891) (recounting examples).
110 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793) (opinion of Jay, C.J.)
(“There was danger that from this source animosities would in time result; and as the
transition from animosities to hostilities was frequent in the history of independent States,
a common tribunal for the termination of controversies became desirable, from motives
both of justice and of policy.”); CARSON, supra note 109, at 66 (noting that controversies
between states “raged with such fierceness as in some instances to lead to bloodshed”);
Kristin A. Linsley, Original Intent: Understanding the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in
Controversies Between States, 18 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 21, 26 (2017) (“Before the formation
of the federal union, the states were separate sovereigns, and, as such, had at least the
theoretical ability to resolve disputes among themselves by war or negotiation.”).
111 CARSON, supra note 109, at 67.
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setts, New Hampshire, New York, and Vermont.112  To avoid these hostilities,
the Articles of Confederation contained a provision for the establishment of
ad hoc tribunals to resolve interstate disputes,113 but the process was rarely
used,114 presumably because a state did not want to send its disputes to a
tribunal that might not have the state’s best interests at heart.
The Constitution sought to prevent the strife and disunity that could
result from these hostilities.  To that end, Article I, Section 10 expressly for-
bids the states from engaging in those activities without the consent of Con-
gress.115  At the same time, the Constitution affords the states an alternative
avenue for resolving their disputes.  Article III authorizes states to bring suits
in the federal courts.116  Thus, as Justice McLean put it, permitting states to
bring suit in federal court was necessary to prevent “an appeal to the
sword.”117
Although the greatest risk of conflict was between states, potential con-
flicts could also arise between the states and the United States.  States and the
United States could disagree over their borders and other topics touching on
sovereignty.118  As Samuel Dana explained in the debates over the Judiciary
Act of 1802, just as states might resort to force to resolve their disputes, so too
in “controversies between a State and the United States . . . [t]he parties . . .
might put armed forces in motion.”119  Extending federal jurisdiction to
state suits against the United States, he explained, aimed to prevent this
mode of dispute resolution.120
In this light, state standing should not be confined to suits asserting
interests cognizable at common law.  Instead it should extend more broadly
to suits asserting categories of interests for which the states would resort to
arms if they had the ability to do so.
The Supreme Court has recognized this point.  It has acknowledged that
Article III expanded the range of justiciable actions to include “[s]ome
112 CARSON, supra note 109, at 76–78.
113 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX.
114 See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 6 n.34 (7th ed. 2015) (identifying only a single case decided through
such a tribunal).
115 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
116 Id. art. III, § 2.
117 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 210, 276 (1840) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 277 (Joseph Chitty
ed., 6th ed. 1844) (1758)).
118 See Lochlan F. Shelfer, The Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction over Disputes Between
the United States and a State, 66 BUFF. L. REV. 193, 216 (2018).
119 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 929 (Joseph Gales & William W. Seaton eds., 1851) (1802).
120 Id.  The most obvious conflict between the states and federal government that led to
hostilities is the Civil War.  Needless to say, it is doubtful that expansive federal jurisdiction
would have prevented that war, especially given the possibility that the decision in Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, was one of the causes of the war. See Daniel A. Farber, A Fatal Loss of
Balance: Dred Scott Revisited, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 13, 14 (2011).
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things . . . which were not known as such at the common law.”121  Thus,
although sovereign interests were not traditionally cognizable, in 1799 Justice
Washington concluded that states could assert sovereign interests in federal
court.122  He stated that, although “a State could [not] sue at law for such an
incorporeal right, as that of sovereignty and jurisdiction,” it could sue at
equity to protect those rights because of the lack of a legal remedy.123
This rationale underlies the decisions upholding the ability of states to
bring boundary challenges.124  Traditionally, boundary disputes were not
cognizable at common law.  Sovereigns resolved those disputes through war
and diplomacy.  Before the states became separate sovereigns in 1776, the
King’s Privy Council resolved boundary disputes through a nonjudicial pro-
cess.125  But as early as 1799, the Court recognized the power of the federal
courts to resolve those disputes.126
Ensuring that the federal government complies with the Constitution
arguably falls within this category of interests.  In ratifying the Constitution,
the states relinquished their ultimate sovereignty to the federal govern-
ment.127  But the risk was that the federal government would be too powerful
and usurp the role of the states.128  The fear led to the idea that the federal
government would have only limited powers and would be constrained by
various structures prescribed by the Constitution.129  Given that these struc-
tures were seen as integral to preserving state sovereignty, states could well be
inclined to resort to arms to force the federal government to comply with
them, if the states had the ability to do so.
121 Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 233–34 (1901).
122 Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 411, 413 (1799) (opinion of Washington, J.).
123 Id.
124 See Linsley, supra note 110, at 32 (“Over the years, disputes between States have
represented the vast majority of the Court’s original jurisdiction cases . . . .”).
125 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *231 (“Whenever also a question arises between two
provinces in America, or elsewhere, as concerning the extent of their charters and the like,
the king in his council exercises original jurisdiction therein, upon the principles of [feu-
dal] sovereignty.”).
126 New York v. Connecticut, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 1, 3 (1799).
127 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 244 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
128 See Akhil Reed Amar, Anti-Federalists, The Federalist Papers, and the Big Argument for
Union, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111 (1993) (discussing the concerns about a centralized
federal government).
129 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few
and defined.  Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite.”); Naomi Harlin Goodno, When the Commerce Clause Goes International: A Proposed
Legal Framework for the Foreign Commerce Clause, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1139, 1154 (2013); Gregory F.
Zoeller, Duty to Defend and the Rule of Law, 90 IND. L.J. 513, 518–19 (2015) (detailing how
the Founders imposed structural constraints to limit the federal government); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (rebutting claims
that the federal government would be supreme by indicating that the federal government’s
“jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a
residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects”).
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IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS AND STATE STANDING
Although there are many reasons that states should be able to sue the
federal government to force it to comply with the law, this does not mean
that states should necessarily have standing to bring those suits.  One might
argue that separation of powers, which the Court has described as the “single
basic idea” underlying Article III standing,130 supports limiting state standing
to enforce compliance with the law.  But that is not so.
Over the years the Court has focused primarily on three ways that stand-
ing protects the separation of powers.131  First, standing doctrine maintains
the balance of power established at the Founding by confining the federal
courts to the historical role of the courts.132  Second, standing doctrine pro-
tects democracy by ensuring that the federal courts do not decide matters
more appropriately addressed to the elected branches of government.133
Third, standing doctrine prevents Congress from infringing on the execu-
tive’s duty to take care that the law is enforced.134  None of these threads of
separation of powers warrant barring state standing to challenge federal diso-
bedience of the law.
A. History
According to the Supreme Court, standing implements the case and
controversy language by authorizing federal courts to resolve only those dis-
putes that were “traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial pro-
cess.”135  This historical vision of the courts, however, does not preclude state
standing to sue the federal government for disobeying the law.
Historically, courts did not recognize the three categories of interests
that form the basis of state standing today—proprietary interests, sovereign
interests, and quasi-sovereign interests.  Instead, courts heard two types of
legal disputes.  The first consisted of suits to vindicate “private rights.”  Pri-
vate rights were the typical rights held by individuals.136  They included,
130 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
131 A fourth separation of powers argument that the Court has occasionally made is
that standing prevents the weakening of the courts by protecting their legitimacy. See Val-
ley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 474 (1982) (suggesting that public confidence in the courts depends on the courts
“refrain[ing] from passing upon the constitutionality of an act [of the representative
branches] unless . . . the question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it”
(second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Blair v. United
States, 250 U.S. 273, 279 (1919))).  There are many reasons to doubt this theory. See Hes-
sick, supra note 93, at 695–97.  And the Court appears to have abandoned it by not having
invoked it for over forty years.
132 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998).
133 See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 407–09 (2013).
134 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992).
135 Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 102).
136 See Hessick, supra note 3, at 280.
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among other things, the rights of personal security, life, liberty, and prop-
erty.137  The victim of a private wrong could seek a remedy by bringing the
appropriate form of action, such as a writ of trespass.138  Like individuals, the
government could hold these private rights—it could, for example, enter
into contracts and own property139—and bring suit to seek remedies for
their violations.140
The second type of dispute was to vindicate “public rights.”  Public rights
were those held collectively by the public.141  They include the right to navi-
gate the public waters of the state and to fish therein, to use the public high-
ways, and to be free from criminal violations.  This body of public rights was
not static.  The legislature could restrict or expand these rights, and it could
create new rights by enacting new laws.142  The violation of a public right was
a public wrong; it hurt the public as a whole, not merely an individual.  Con-
sequently, the government, as the representative of the public, was the
proper party to bring suit to vindicate that public right.143
American law adopted this framework.  States could bring suit to pursue
private interests,144 and as the representatives of the public, states had the
power to vindicate state public rights.  The most obvious example is that
states could bring prosecutions for violations of states’ criminal laws.145  Fed-
eral courts adhered to the same view.  The United States could bring suit to
assert contractual and other “private” rights.146  It also could bring suit to
137 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *141; 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW 1 (O.W. Holmes, Jr., ed., Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 12th ed. 1873) (1826) (“The
absolute rights of individuals may be resolved into the right of personal security, the right
of personal liberty, and the right to acquire and enjoy property.  These rights have been
justly considered, and frequently declared, by the people of this country, to be natural,
inherent, and unalienable.”); Hessick, supra note 3, at 280.
138 Hessick, supra note 3, at 280.
139 See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 455 (1793) (opinion of Wilson, J.)
(“[A state] may acquire property distinct from that of its members: It may incur debts to be
discharged out of the public stock, not out of the private fortunes of individuals.  It may be
bound by contracts; and for damages arising from the breach of those contracts.”).
140 See 2 GEORGE STUART ROBERTSON, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS BY
AND AGAINST THE CROWN AND DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT, WITH NUMEROUS FORMS
AND PRECEDENTS 146 (1908) (recounting the Crown’s power to sue for debt and other
“private actions”).
141 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *5 (referring to “the public rights and duties,
due to the whole community, considered as a community, in its social aggregate capacity”).
142 See Hessick, supra note 3, at 280.
143 Id.; see, e.g., State v. Duestoe, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 377, 375 (1794) (state prosecution of
crimes).
144 See Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 415, 415 (1793) (resolving debt suit by a
state); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 406
(1995) (“[S]ome common-law ‘individual’ rights could easily be ‘states’ rights’ as well.  For
example, states are capable of owning and suffering injury to property.  Furthermore,
states can be party to contracts with individuals who might breach those contracts.”).
145 See State v. Phelps, 1 Kirby 282, 282 (Conn. 1787).
146 See United States v. Gurney, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 333 (1808) (breach of contract
action brought by the United States).
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vindicate federal public rights, such as by seeking punishment against those
who violated federal criminal laws.147
Although the courts did not recognize the three categories of interests
that support state standing under modern doctrine, those three categories
are the offspring of those historical rights.  Today’s proprietary-interest stand-
ing derives from private rights suits.148  According to the Court, the injury-in-
fact test, which serves as the gatekeeper for standing based on proprietary
interests, ensures that the judiciary stays within its “province . . . of decid[ing]
on the rights of individuals.”149
Likewise, today’s standing based on sovereign and quasi-sovereign inter-
ests derives from suits alleging violations of public law.  As with the historical
public rights, only the government has standing to assert those interests.150
Moreover, both sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests fall within the defini-
tion of public rights.  That is clearly so for sovereign interests, which include
the ancient public rights identified by Blackstone, such as enforcing the crim-
inal law.151
But it is also true for the two quasi-sovereign interests identified by the
Court—preserving the well-being of the state’s populace and ensuring the
state is “not . . . discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal
system.”152  Maintaining the well-being of the populace is an interest held
collectively by the community; it is for this reason that the criminal laws,
which exist to protect the well-being of the public, constitute public rights.
Similarly, the residents of a state collectively have a shared interest in their
state being treated equally.  The community, as a whole, benefits when the
community is treated equally by others.  What this means is that disputes
involving quasi-sovereign interests are of the sort that courts could histori-
cally address.  They accordingly fit the definition of public rights that sover-
eigns could press in the courts.
Still, one might argue that this history does not support state standing
insofar as courts did not historically hear claims involving the precise quasi-
sovereign interests recognized by today’s law.  But it is unclear whether this is
accurate.  Governments did bring suits to protect the general welfare.  Suits
to address public nuisances, which affected the whole community, are an
example.  Those actions were to cure a “violation of a public right at com-
mon law.”153
147 See United States v. Mundell, 27 F. Cas. 23 (C.C.D. Va. 1795) (No. 15,834) (describ-
ing the authority of the Attorney General to prosecute).
148 Hessick, supra note 3, at 300.
149 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803)).
150 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 605–06
(1982) (discussing how only governments may assert those interests).
151 See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 44, at *2–3.
152 Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 593.
153 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1551 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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To the extent that courts did not adjudicate disputes involving questions
of sovereign powers, a major reason is that sovereigns often chose to resolve
their claims through diplomacy and war instead of adjudication.  Sovereigns
could go to court to assert their interests, however, if they chose to do so.154
But even assuming that courts could not hear those disputes in the past,
this does not mean that they are incapable of doing so today.  As noted ear-
lier, the domain of public rights was not static.  New rights could be created,
and old rights abolished.  Nothing prohibited the law from recognizing that
the states had a public right in protecting their borders.  Indeed, new rights
of that sort were to be expected.  As the Court has explained, the decision to
extend federal jurisdiction to state suits expanded the range of justiciable
actions to include “[s]ome things . . . which were not known as such at the
common law.”155
Consistent with this view, states have regularly sued in federal court to
vindicate their sovereign interests.156  The most common type of suits of this
sort consisted of border disputes.157  Historically, courts did not resolve those
disputes.158  But from the early nineteenth century, federal courts recog-
nized their power to adjudicate them.  These suits thus signify an expansion
of justiciable public rights.
One might argue that those disputes are justiciable because they involve
traditional property rights instead of newly recognized public rights.  The
Court espoused this view in Georgia v. Stanton, stating that federal courts
could not resolve disputes “of a political character” and that boundary dis-
putes were justiciable because they involved rights of property.159  But that
view is wrong on two fronts.  For one, decisions before and after Stanton have
recognized that border disputes are not simply property disputes.  Instead,
they present the question of which state has the right to regulate that terri-
154 See Hullett v. King of Spain (1828) 4 Eng. Rep. 1041, 1048; 2 Bligh N.S. 31, 47–48
(holding justiciable an action by the king of Spain).
155 Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 233–34 (1901).
156 An early example of the former type of suit is Georgia v. Brailsford, in which the
Supreme Court entertained a claim by Georgia to recover a debt against individuals in
South Carolina.  2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 415, 415 (1793).
157 Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 288 (1888).
158 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
159 Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 77 (1867).  Although not discussed in
terms of standing, the limitation on federal jurisdiction in Stanton appears to be one of
standing.  The reason that the Court refused to hear the case was that Georgia had not
alleged a cognizable interest in seeking to enforce a so-called political right of whether it
could be subject to military rule. See id.  Subsequently, in Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
85 (1868), the Court did resolve the issue.  There, an individual sought a writ of habeas
corpus on the ground that the military government was unlawful. Id. at 87–88.  Unlike in
Stanton, the Court concluded that the individual in Yerger had standing because he was
seeking to enforce a judicially cognizable right. Id. at 102; see Woolhandler & Collins,
supra note 142, at 421–22 (discussing this point).
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tory.160  Illustrative is Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, in which the dispute was
whether Massachusetts’s boundary claim had “prevent[ed] the exercise of
the rightful jurisdiction and sovereignty of Rhode Island.”161  For another, it
is simply not true that political disputes were necessarily deemed nonjusticia-
ble.  The Founders recognized that state disputes would involve political mat-
ters.  As James Madison put it in Federalist 39, “in the trial of controversies to
which States may be parties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in
their collective and political capacities only.”162
B. Democratically Accountable Branches
A second role of standing is to ensure that the federal courts stay within
the “proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic soci-
ety.”163  In a democratic society, the people should ultimately set policy.  The
Constitution implements that goal by leaving policymaking to elected offi-
cials and not to the courts.  Standing enforces this division of power.  Permit-
ting individuals to resort to court to challenge government activities
undermines this political process.  They accordingly may go to court only to
redress injuries that they have suffered.
This theory underlies the restriction on the standing of individuals to
bring suit to force the government to comply with the law.  According to the
Court, that injury is a “generalized grievance” that is “undifferentiated and
‘common to all members of the public.’”164  Thus, redressing that injury is
not “the business of the courts” but is instead for “the political branches.”165
For an individual to have standing, she must suffer a distinct, concrete harm
beyond that experienced by the general public.
But this logic does not translate to state standing.  One of the functions
of the states is to enforce compliance with the law, and they regularly sue for
breaches of the law that do not harm the state in a distinct and concrete way.
More important, unlike individuals, states are democratically accounta-
ble bodies, and the officials who decide whether to bring suit on behalf of the
state are elected themselves or are answerable to elected officials.  A state’s
decision to bring suit thus does not subvert the political process; instead it
reflects the views of the people as embodied by their elected officials.
160 See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 752–53 (1838) (Taney,
C.J., dissenting) (complaining that the suits over which the Court found standing involved
not property disputes, but instead jurisdictional disputes).
161 Id. at 716.
162 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
163 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
164 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575 (1992) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974)).
165 Id. at 576.
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C. Protecting the Executive
A third function of standing identified by the Court is to protect the
President’s Article II duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted.”166  This theory played a central role in the Court’s decision in Lujan
v. Defenders of Wildlife.167  There, the Court held that an individual who had
not suffered a particularized injury lacked standing to force the government
to comply with the Endangered Species Act.  The Court explained that
allowing anyone to sue to force the government to comply with the law would
effectively transfer from the President to the courts the task of enforcing fed-
eral public laws and, accordingly, would result in courts overseeing the exec-
utive branch.168
Lujan’s rationale rests on shaky ground.  The Take Care Clause does not
confer power on the President; it imposes a duty on the President—a duty to
“take care” that the laws be enforced.169  The imposition of a duty does not
carry with it exclusive power to perform that duty.  Rather, it simply obliges
the person to make sure that the designated task gets done.  On that view,
the Take Care Clause does not confer exclusive power on the President to
enforce the law; instead it requires the President to see that the law is
enforced if no one else does.
Decisions since Lujan are consistent with this view.  Most notable is
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., in which
the Court held that private individuals had standing to seek civil penalties
paid to the United States against a factory that violated the Clean Water
Act.170  As Justice Scalia, the author of Lujan, noted in dissent, allowing pri-
vate individuals to seek public remedies is inconsistent with the idea that the
President alone has the responsibility for enforcing the law.171
More important for purposes of this Essay, the longstanding practice of
the states illustrates that the Take Care Clause does not confer exclusive
power on the President to enforce the law.  States traditionally have enforced
federal public laws.  They regularly execute searches and seizures based on
violations of federal criminal statutes,172 as well as for violations of federal
immigration laws.173
166 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
167 Lujan, 504 U.S. 555.
168 Id. at 577 (“It would enable the courts, with the permission of Congress, to assume a
position of authority over the governmental acts of another and co-equal department, and
to become virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive
action.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
169 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
170 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–88
(2000).
171 Id. at 209–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172 See Marsh v. United States, 29 F.2d 172, 174 (2d Cir. 1928); Kerr, supra note 84, at
478.
173 See Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of Immi-
gration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 282–84 (2011) (providing examples of state
enforcement of immigration laws).
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Nor is there any reason to think that, even if Article II permits states to
enforce federal laws, it forbids them from enforcing laws against the federal
government.  Nothing in the text of the Take Care Clause suggests that the
federal government has special immunity from suits alleging violations of fed-
eral law.  If anything, the Clause supports state suits against the federal gov-
ernment.  The Clause imposes a duty, and duties exist to be enforced.174
And one cannot expect the President to always enforce federal laws against
the federal government.  Because the President is the head of the executive
branch, he has incentives not to address the government’s failure to comply
with the law.  States accordingly have a more important role in enforcing the
law against the federal government.
V. STATUTORY LIMITATIONS
Although states should have Article III standing to bring suit against the
federal government for disobeying the law, there are prudential reasons for
restricting the ability of states to sue the federal government.  For example,
even if it does not raise constitutional problems, conferring standing on the
states to bring those suits may result in undue interference with the federal
government.  States should not be permitted, for example, to sue the Depart-
ment of Justice to enforce federal criminal law.  It might also create addi-
tional friction between the federal judiciary and other branches of
government.  And permitting those suits may consume too many judicial
resources or result in ill-advised judicial decisions.  An influx of state suits
might force the federal judiciary to resolve difficult disputes quickly and with-
out adequate reflection.
These pragmatic considerations underlie the prudential restriction on
states invoking parens patriae standing to sue the United States.  Courts clearly
have the authority to make prudential restrictions of this sort.  The law has
many judicially created doctrines limiting federal jurisdiction.175
But that the courts have the power to create this type of restriction does
not mean that they should.  That is because limiting state standing disrupts
the balance of power in the Constitution, and if that balance is to be dis-
turbed, Congress is the appropriate body to make that determination.
The Constitution constrains government power by empowering the
states to act as a check on the federal government.  The primary check is that
the states play a central role in filling the offices of the federal government.
Under the Constitution, states draw districts for electing members of the
House of Representatives, appoint presidential electors, and elect senators.
174 See Miller v. Strahl, 239 U.S. 426, 432 (1915) (“[H]e who assumes duties may be
required to perform them.”).
175 Examples include third-party standing, abstention, and ripeness. See David L. Sha-
piro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 552 (1985) (listing these and other
doctrines).
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These provisions give the states considerable influence in the political
branches where they can affect federal policy.176
Another state check is the ability to bring suit against the United States.
Through those suits, the states can ensure that the federal government does
not exceed the law.  Limiting state standing to sue the federal government
interferes with this arrangement.  It confers an immunity, protecting the fed-
eral government from the states.177
Because it limits the power of the states to check the federal govern-
ment, the states should play a role in deciding whether to limit their stand-
ing.  The enactment of a federal law stripping states of standing to sue the
government does this to some extent.  Because of the states’ role in Congress
and the presidency, it signifies a decision at least indirectly supported by the
states to protect the federal government.178
By contrast, because of the salary and tenure guarantees in Article III,
states have significantly less influence over federal judges.179  Judicially cre-
ated doctrines accordingly not only limit the power of the states; they do so
without the states’ consent.180
To be sure, Congress can enact legislation overturning judicially created
doctrines limiting state standing.  But that is hardly the equivalent of leaving
it up to Congress to limit jurisdiction in the first place.  Enacting legislation is
difficult to do.  Political and resource hurdles would make it unlikely for
Congress to abolish prudential limits on standing.
Proceeding by legislation instead of court-created doctrine would have
other advantages.  Congress is in a better position than the courts to assess
most of the prudential considerations raised by state standing to sue the fed-
eral government.  It can better determine whether those state suits consume
too many resources or overly interfere with federal policy.
Moreover, proceeding by legislation would reduce confusion in state
standing and improve the predictability of the law.  Courts create doctrine
176 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 291 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“[E]ach of the principal branches of the federal government will owe its existence more
or less to the favor of the State governments, and must consequently feel a dependence,
which is much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious than too overbearing
towards them.”); Wechsler, supra note 101, at 547.
177 Other examples of intergovernmental immunity include the restriction on state tax-
ation of the federal government and the inability of state courts to issue writs of habeas
corpus to federal detainees.
178 See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 101, at 560 (arguing that Congress, and not the
courts, protects federalism).
179 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
180 As Professor Bickel argued, the Supreme Court should have the power to decline to
hear some suits to avoid creating tension with the other branches of the federal govern-
ment. See Alexander M. Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
But this passive virtue theory does not support broad restrictions on state standing.  The
passive virtues support declining jurisdiction in particular cases that raise particularly
fraught issues; it does not support a doctrine that applies to a breadth of cases.
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through the development and application of principles.181  But the Court’s
standing decisions do not rest on a single principle.  Instead, they often rest
on other considerations, such as whether recognizing standing would inter-
fere with an important federal program.  Consider the discrepancy between
the decisions recognizing state standing in border disputes and the decisions
holding that states lack standing to challenge the establishment of military
governments in a state.  These discrepancies lead to doctrinal confusion and
the creation of seemingly arbitrary distinctions.
Limiting jurisdiction by legislation avoids these pitfalls.  Congress is not
bound by principle or past legislation.  It accordingly can fashion federal
jurisdiction in ways that appear inconsistent, simply because Congress finds it
desirable to do so.  For another, proceeding by legislation would leave open
the possibility of expanding the types of suits that states could bring, if it is
determined that the existing rules are too narrow.
181 Charles Fried, Commentary, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1140, 1145
(1994) (discussing the role of “rules or principles” in the development of doctrine).
